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What made the invitation to participate in the Writing  Across the Mar-
gins symposium  irresistible was  not only  the prospect  of swapping  tales
with fellow trespassers,  but also the spirit of risk-taking  that seems to have
animated the conference plan.  Even the word  "margins,"  which ordinarily
would connote more or less fixed bounds, becomes  elastic in the lexicon of
Lash LaRue.  "Come to Lexington,"  he said,  "and talk about rhetoric  or
authority in constitutional law; or about the difficulties or rewards of cross-
disciplinary or cross-national  research;  or any or  all of the above."
That was an offer I could not refuse.  I will confine myself to just one
aspect of the topic:  the question of why anyone engages  in interdisciplinary
or comparative  legal studies given the formidable practical difficulties and
the high risk of error or failure.
I will be brief about the difficulties,  for they are fairly obvious.  The
major problem is that if cross-disciplinarians  waited to know  as much as we
feel we ought before writing, we could never put pen to paper.  The same
may be said, of course,  of any researcher  in the natural or human sciences
because the horizon of human knowledge  recedes  as the mind approaches
it.  But the risks of error,  oversight, and misunderstanding  increase  expo-
nentially if one combines  disciplines,  legal systems,  and languages.
Some  might  include  on  the list  of disadvantages  the  risk of being
regarded by one's peers with indifference  or a certain amount of suspicion.
Consider the pioneers  of the new science of complexity,  formerly  known
as  "chaos  science."  They are mathematicians,  physicists,  and  biologists
who  suffered  considerable  professional  disadvantages  in their  respective
disciplines.'  Because they strayed across the margins  of several fields,  they
were regarded  as neither fish nor fowl.  They  were treated as  outsiders  for
many years by physics,  math, and life science departments.
*  Learned  Hand  Professor  of Law,  Harvard  Law  School.  Professor  Glendon
delivered  this address at the Writing Across the Margins symposium held at Washington and
Lee University  School of Law  on November  3,  1995.
1.  See JAMEs GLEICK,  CHAOS:  MAKING A  NEW SCIENCE  37-38,  66 (1987).53 WASH.  & LEE L. REV. 971  (1996)
Fortunately,  the field of law has been relatively  hospitable to cross-
disciplinary  work,  in part  because law  students  arrive  with  such varied
educational  backgrounds  and because so many lawyers  have to be  general-
ists.  Lawyers  have  learned  that what  begins  as  trespass  can  become
possession if the poacher  settles  down and  cultivates the area.  And,  as
property  students know,  the right  sort of possession  kept up  for a  suffi-
cient length of time may even end in ownership.  The law and economics
movement,  which  was just getting  started  when  I  was  a  student  at  the
University of Chicago,  affords  a striking example  of how  scholars who
began by writing across the margins can ultimately rewrite the page and
relocate  the margins.
Some  interdisciplinary  projects,  however,  remain  outside  the legal
mainstream.  In the United States,  for example,  that has been the fate of
comparative  law.  American  comparatists,  in fact,  often  find  that  our
colleagues  abroad  welcome  our  enterprise  more  than  our  colleagues  at
home.  To many  American lawyers,  an interest  in other legal systems  is
something  like  an interest in wines:  a little knowledge  about them  is a sign
of good taste and  sophistication, but a serious  dedication may be evidence
of waste,  or luxury,  or even worse.
Sometimes  it is just old-fashioned  chauvinism that causes American
lawyers  to resist cross-national comparison.  But more  often their skeptical
attitudes  reflect the  same  doubts that comparatists  themselves  entertain.
As  the  domestic  legal  environment  becomes  ever  more  complex  and
specialized,  it is hard enough  to keep abreast of even one comer  of our
own  legal system.  The more areas,  systems,  and approaches  one  tries to
cover, the more one becomes  vulnerable  to Judge  Harry Edward's  charge
of producing  work  that is  neither  useful  to  the  legal  community  nor  a
significant contribution to other fields of human knowledge.2  It is difficult
to deny that Judge Edwards  has a point when he complains that:  "Our law
reviews  are now full of mediocre interdisciplinary  articles.  Too many law
professors  are  ivory tower dilettantes,  pursuing whatever subject  piques
their  interest,  whether  or not the subject merits scholarship  and whether
or not they have  the scholarly  skills to master it. 3
With  comparative  law,  the difficulties escalate.  We  not only must
become  familiar with the technical  aspects  of another  legal  system,  but
we  also have to assess how the law on the books  actually operates in its
own social context.  In other words,  we must become  comparative  social
2.  See  generally Harry  T.  Edwards,  The  Growing Disjunction Between  Legal
Education and the Legal Profession, 91  MICH. L. REv.  34  (1992).
3.  Id. at 36.WHY  CROSS BOUNDARIES?
scientists in the broadest sense.  And often,  we must learn another lan-
guage.
The harder we  try to avoid the pitfalls identified  by Judge Edwards,
the  more  likely we  are  to  become  mired  in an  even  more  intractable
problem: the field of human knowledge  is vast and life,  alas,  is short.  On
one side of our path, then,  is the swamp of superficiality;  on the other,  the
lime-pit  of limitless  learning.  The  path  itself is  slippery,  and  we  can
never see more than a few paces  ahead.
Why,  then, would anyone undertake  comparative  legal  studies?  For
most of the American comparatists  of the previous  generation,  the answer
was  easy:  they had  no choice.  Nearly  all of them were  European-born
lawyers  forced  to  emigrate  and  start  over  from  scratch  in  the  1930s.1
Some,  like  my teacher Max Rheinstein,  were already comparatists.  The
majority,  however,  had comparison thrust upon them.
For most of the current generation,  I venture  to guess  that the first
steps were not taken pursuant to any plan,  but rather involved  some casual
trespass  that led to an  "aha" experience  - an experience so pleasurable
that we felt impelled to try to repeat it.  A good example is David Currie,
who taught and  wrote  about American environmental  and constitutional
law at the University of Chicago for many years before his dean,  Gerhard
Casper, encouraged him to take a research  leave in Freiburg.  Currie was
attracted to the idea because he had always  enjoyed studying languages.
I suppose he must have embarked  on the experience as  something of
a lark, a vacation from his magisterial  history of the Constitution  in the
United States Supreme  Court.5  In Freiburg,  he began looking  into how
Germany was dealing with problems  of pollution,  and he made,  as he put
it to me in a recent conversation,  "a series  of minor discoveries."  They
seem to  have affected  him  like eating  peanuts.  He  turned  to  German
constitutional  law, where he came upon the notion of "positive rights"  -
the idea that the state must not only refrain from infringing certain rights,
but must affirmatively  promote them,  even to the point of setting condi-
tions for their effective exercise.6  He  describes his  encounter with that
concept  as  "eye-opening"  because  it enabled  him  to  notice  aspects  of
American constitutional law that he had never considered before.
4.  See DER EINFLUss  DEUTSCHER  EMIGRANTEN  AUF DIE RECHTSENTWICKLUNG  IN
DEN  USA  UND  IN  DEUTSCHLAND 1-31 (Marcus Lutter et al. eds.,  1993).
5.  See generally DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTON  IN THE SUPREME  COURT:  THE
FIRST  HUNDRED  YEARS  (1985);  DAVID  P.  CURRIE,  THE  CONSTITUTION  IN  THE SUPREME
COURT:  THE SECOND CENTURY  (1990).
6.  See generally David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional  Rights, 53 U.
CHn.  L. REv.  864 (1986).53  WASH.  & LEE L. REV. 971 (1996)
Out  of Currie's margin-crossing  came  several  important  writings,
including  an essay  on positive and negative  rights in American law7  and
a  treatise in English on German  constitutional law.'  He has gone  on to
learn Italian and is currently planning a book on Italian constitutional  law.
What gets a scholar hooked on comparative  legal studies,  I believe,
are  not  the  usual  pragmatic  justifications  that  can  be  given  for  cross-
national  research.9  Whatever  prompts  one's  original  step  across  the
margins,  what grips  and holds people  is one of the most powerful  drives
known to the human species:  the  unrestricted desire  to know.  If hauled
up before Judge  Edwards and charged  with trespassing,  the only  honest
defense most comparatists could offer would be,  "I couldn't help  it."
I  would  like,  therefore,  to  focus  on the  question  whether there  is
some  reason why  trespass  should be  especially  productive  of fertile  in-
sights such  as those  that abound  in the fine book on rhetoric in constitu-
tional  law  that we have  gathered  here  to celebrate.  That question falls
somewhere  within psychology,  philosophy,  and history, but has received
relatively little attention from any of those  disciplines.  By insight,  I mean
the  "aha" experience - the major and minor flashes of understanding that
seemingly  pop into one's mind out of nowhere.  The classic instance  is the
tale  of Archimedes,  who  became  discouraged  while  trying  to  devise  a
method  for measuring  the  proportion  of  gold  in a  crown.  He  betook
himself to the public baths, where,  as legend has it, he was  idly noting the
displacement of water by his body,  when he had an idea so powerful that
he ran naked into the street shouting a "Eureka!"  that has echoed through
the centuries. 10
Modem firsthand accounts  of path-breaking  discoveries  suggest that
there may well  be a connection between  important insights like Archime-
des's and the crossing of boundaries.  A common thread  in these stories
is a  complete  inability  (on the part of some of the most brilliant people
who have ever lived) to explain just how they  initially reached the break-
through in question.  It is significant  that they characteristically  insist the
insight  was  not achieved  through  long  study,  although  long  study  does
7.  Id.
8.  See generally DAVID P.  CURRIE,  THE CONSTITUTION  OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY  (1994).
9.  See generally MARY  ANN  GLENDON ET AL.,  COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS
8-11  (2d ed.  1994)  (describing  typical  pragmatic justifications  given  for  cross-national
research).
10.  See BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN,  INSIGHT: A STUDY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING  3-6
(1958)  (introducing  his masterful  study  of how  we  know  what  we  know  with  story  of
Archimedes).WHY CROSS BOUNDARIES?
seem to be a prerequisite.  As Louis  Pasteur put it,  "Fortune favors the
prepared mind.""
A typical account is that given by the mathematician  Karl Friedrich
Gauss to a friend of how he finally found the solution to a problem with
which he had been struggling for four years.  "At last,"  wrote Gauss,  "I
succeeded,  not by dint of painful effort but so to speak by the grace  of
God.  As a sudden flash of light,  the enigma was  solved ....  For my
part I am unable  to name the nature of the thread which connected what
I previously knew with that which  made my  success  possible." 2
It is noteworthy that Gauss and others have  stressed that their break-
throughs  did not emerge from logical and systematic processes  of induc-
tion or deduction.  In fact,  it was only some time later that Gauss logically
worked  out the proof to validate  his discovery.  The sequence  of proof
following discovery  is easy to overlook because  when we  read about the
solution of a mathematical  or scientific  problem in a textbook,  the order
is always  reversed:  we are  shown the proof as though it had led to the
solution.
Students of cognitive theory  (philosophers and psychologists writing
across  the  margins of their disciplines)  situate such episodes  within the
dynamic  structure of human knowing:  the cumulative  processes through
which all of us attend to the world around us,  reflect on our experiences,
get  ideas  about them,  and use  reason  to  sort  the  good  ideas  from  the
duds.' 3  That  recurrent  process  of  experiencing,  understanding,  and
evaluating  regularly  generates  insights  - not  only  great  ideas  on rare
occasions  in the minds of geniuses,  but also little bright ideas  in the minds
of all of us  every day.
In  the  recurrent  mental  operations  that we  collectively  refer  to  as
"knowing,"  the insight part is the most mysterious.  If it is not the crown-
ing step in a chain of logical reasoning and if it requires preparation - but
preparation  alone cannot  make it happen - where does  it come  from?
What  makes  insight more  or less  likely?  What  triggers  insights  of high
quality,  the kind that stand up to logical  scrutiny and open new vistas?
Some  who have  speculated  about these  questions  suggest that there
are  conditions that affect  the  frequency  and  quality  of creative  mental
activity in individuals and in groups.  The  science historian Thomas Kuhn
11.  Quoted in ARTHUR KOESTLER,  THE ACT OF CREATION:  A STUDY  OF THE CON-
SCIOUS AND  UNCONSCIOUS  PROCESSES OF HUMOR,  SCIENTIFIC  DISCOVERY,  AND  ART  113
(1964).
12.  Quoted in id. at 117.
13.  See generally LONERGAN,  supra note  10.53  WASH.  & LEE L. REV.  971 (1996)
contends  that significant advances  in the  natural sciences  have generally
been  made by people  who combine  two qualities that  do not always  sit
easily with one another:  mastery of the normal  science of their times,  plus
the  boldness to break with the intellectual  framework  within which that
normal science  takes place.14  A classic example  is Charles  Darwin,  who
was fully immersed in the biological  science of his day before he got the
ideas  that utterly  transformed  it.
Arthur Koestler's studies of artistic and scientific  creativity point to
another condition that seems closely  associated with the kinds of insights
that  change  the  way  we  understand  the  world.  Koestler  noticed  that
transformative  breakthroughs  have often been sparked by what he called
"bisociation."' 5  Bisociation was his name for what happens when two or
more  well-developed  but relatively autonomous  matrices of thought and
experience  come  into contact.16  Such encounters  across disciplinary  or
cultural  boundaries,  according  to Koestler,  seem to trigger a fertile pro-
cess  of uncovering,  selecting,  reshuffling,  combining,  and  synthesizing
data,  ideas,  and skills.17
What  do those  descriptions  of great moments  of intellectual  history
have  to do with  our  homely discipline  of law?  They  are like  a photo-
graphic enlargement  of the  same mental operations  that take place  in the
minds  of all of us from  infancy onward.  The  insights  of a lawyer or a
toddler may be less  momentous than those of a Gauss,  but the process is
the same.
A  few years  ago I  came  across  a passage  in an essay by a  French
historian that comes as close as  anything I have seen to specifying the kind
of "aha"  that legal  comparatists  regularly experience.  Fernand Braudel
put it this way:  "Live in England for a year and you will  not learn much
about the  English.  But when you return  to France  you will  see,  in the
light  of your surprise,  that which had remained  hidden to you because  it
was  so familiar." '8
That  is  precisely  what happened  to David Currie when he  went  to
Freiburg.  And that is what kept great comparatists  like Max Rheinstein
and John  P.  Dawson  enthusiastic  and productive  right up  to the end of
14.  See THOMAS S.  KUHN,  THE ESSENTIAL  TENSION:  SELECTED  STUDIES  IN SCIENTIFIC
TRADITION AND  CHANGE  225-39  (1977).
15.  See generally KOESTLER,  supra  note  11.
16.  Id.
17.  Id. at 108-09,  120; see also GLEICK,  supra  note  1, at 37.
18.  FERNAND  BRAUDEL,  HISTOIRE  ET  SCIENCES  SOCIALE:  LA  LONGUE  DURE,
ANNALES:  ECONOMIES,  SOCI9TIS,  CIVILISATIONS  725, 737  (1958).WHY  CROSS  BOUNDARIES?
their lives.  There is something compelling  about the experience  of seeing
something about our own  legal  system  "in the  light of [our]  surprise,"
something that would probably have  remained invisible to us without the
perspective  from another  country,  or culture,  or from other  disciplines
such as literature,  history, and economics.  Then,  as we reason about and
critically  evaluate  what we  have seen,  we  are  off to the  races:  the  re-
current  steps  in the dynamic,  cumulative  processes of human knowing.
Those processes  of experiencing,  understanding,  reasoning,  and judging,
in turn,  lead to cognitive restructuring,  higher viewpoints,  and  fresh in-
sights.  And so it goes.
Like Currie,  I stumbled into comparative  law through language:  Max
Rheinstein  recruited  me  for  the  University  of Chicago's  Foreign  Law
Program  because of my schoolbook French.  When I became a law pro-
fessor, it seemed natural to me, when dealing with the problems  our legal
system does not handle very well,  to look around to see how those prob-
lems were dealt with in the legal  systems of other liberal democracies.  I
began to realize,  through comparative constitutional  studies,  that the post-
World War II language of human rights,  like  other languages,  is  spoken
in different dialects.  That realization led to the recognition that our Amer-
ican  form  of rights  talk  is  quite  distinctive. 19  It  differs  in  significant
respects  from  the discourse  embodied  in the  United  Nations  Universal
Declaration  of Human  Rights  and  in  many  continental  European  legal
systems.  That realization,  in turn,  led me into problems  of cultural  and
legal hermeneutics  that other panelists  here have approached  from differ-
ent interdisciplinary  routes.  More recently,  it has drawn me into the study
of the  migration of legal  ideas,  of legal  syncretism,  and  of the way in
which  differing  rights  ideas  can  merge with,  colonize,  displace,  or be
displaced by  one another.
To return now to the question I posed at the outset:  Can one say any
more  about  the conditions  that promote  fertile  ideas?  This  is  not just
a matter of interest to scholars.  When longtime practicing  lawyers  are
asked what  qualities  they value  in an associate,  they  often say  that the
pearl beyond price  is the associate who,  in addition to possessing all the
usual  legal skills,  is regularly  able to come up with problem-solving  ideas.
But good ideas  cannot be produced on demand.  Nor can we do much
to upgrade  the mental equipment we received at birth.  We can, however,
cultivate the "prepared mind"  of which Pasteur  spoke;2 " we can be atten-
19.  See MARY  ANN  GLENDON,  RIGHTS  TALK: TH  IMPOVERISHMENT  OF  POLITICAL
DISCOURSE  12  (1991).
20.  See KOESTLER,  supra note  11.53 WASH.  & LEE L. REV.  971  (1996)
tive to experience and we can develop  our reasoning skills.  Beyond that,
cognitive  theory  suggests  that  confrontation  or comparison  of different
spheres  of  meaning  increases  the  probability  of insights  and  opens  up
previously unrecognized  avenues  of inquiry.2'  Legal  sociologist Gunther
Teubner refers to such encounters as  "shocks" that promote  transformative
restructuring  by  shaking  up  the  categories  within  which  we  habitually
work.'  But  "triggers"  and  "shocks"  are  metaphors,  not explanations.
Perhaps  the most one can say  is  that  "bisociation"  seems to work even
though we do not know  why or how.
Let  me  now  return to two points  I  mentioned  earlier:  the fact that
most bright  ideas  are duds and the fact that most paradigm-transforming
achievements  have not been produced  by rebels who  scorned the work of
their predecessors,  but by innovators  who respected and mastered a tradi-
tion.  Think here  not  only of Darwin,  but Picasso,  Stravinsky,  or T.S.
Eliot.  For  those  of us  who  labor  at  less  exalted  levels,  does  that not
condemn us to the slippery  slope  of superficiality or the hopelessly  long
march toward the book we will never be quite ready  to write?
In  facing  that  dilemma,  legal  scholars  might  do  well  to  ponder
Thomas Kuhn's  observation that, more often than not,  it is the community
of specialized  knowers,  rather than any single individual,  that possesses
the  requisite  combination  of a rigorous  grounding  in tradition  with  an
innovative spirit.'  When both qualities are well-represented  in the profes-
sional mix and when both traditionalists  and innovators  are well-grounded
in normal  science,  you have what Kuhn calls  the "essential  tension" that
promotes creativity.u  The tension benefits the entire  group by pulling all
of its members  in both directions.'  The  stage  is then set for collective
achievements  like quantum  theory,  or the  American  Founding,  or at a
more modest level,  law and economics.
Kuhn's  observations  are especially pertinent to a field like  compara-
tive law.  European comparative law institutes have tackled the problem
of amassing  the  requisite  languages  and  technical  legal  knowledge  by
fostering scholarly collaboration.  Thirty years of collaborative  effort on
the International  Encyclopedia of Comparative Law under the direction of
Ulrich  Drobnig  at  Hamburg's  Max  Planck  Institute  for  Foreign  and
21.  See LONERGAN,  supra note  10,  at 626  (discussing  shock effect of humor).
22.  See Gunther Teubner,  The Two Faces of Janus:  Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13
CARDOZO  L. REv.  1443,  1453-56  (1992).
23.  See KUHN, supra note  14,  at 227-28.
24.  Id. at 225.
25.  Id. at 234.WHY CROSS BOUNDARIES?
International Law provide eloquent testimony  both to the difficulties  and
rewards of teamwork.
In light of Thomas Kuhn's research,  however,  I cannot help wonder-
ing about the implications  for our own legal system when so many Ameri-
can legal scholars  currently are disdainful of our own equivalent  of normal
science,  namely,  the  study  and  practice  of  law.  The  American  legal
academy  seems  to  be  well-supplied  with  iconoclasts,  but  these  daring
individuals  often have a shallow understanding  of their own legal tradi-
tions  and of the nuts and bolts of the legal  system.  A related concern is
that so many legal scholars  work in relative  isolation and,  as a result,  lose
the benefits that can attend more self-consciously  collaborative  enterprises.
On the other hand,  one need not  find one's intellectual  companions
in one's own discipline,  or one's own nation-state,  or even in one's own
time.  In fact, the most moving  account of reaching  across margins that
I have ever seen is about friendship with the dead.  I would like to close,
therefore,  with a few lines from a letter by  a thinker who initiated a great
transformation  in political  philosophy.  He had just been  released from
prison and was keeping,  as we would say,  a low profile,  working outdoors
on his  estate,  with few opportunities  for intelligent conversation.  In the
evenings,  however,  he writes:
I return to my house  and go into my study.  At the door I take off
my clothes  of the  day,  covered  with mud  and mire,  and I put on my
regal  and courtly garments;  and decently  reclothed,  I enter the ancient
courts of ancient  men,  where,  received  by them lovingly,  I feed  on the
food that alone is  mine and that I was born for.  There I am not ashamed
to speak with them and to  ask them the reasons for their  actions;  and
they in their humanity  reply to  me.  And for the space  of four hours I
feel no boredom, I forget  every pain,  I do  not fear poverty,  death  does
not frighten  me.  I deliver myself entirely  to them.26
The  letter is  dated  December  10,  1513.  The writer was that tradition-
haunted  paradigm-breaker,  Niccolb Machiavelli.
It is worth recalling that Machiavelli  would not have  located himself
within  the  then-unknown  discipline  of political  science  any  more  than
Adam Smith would have called himself an economist.  The freedom they
enjoyed to  roam from  one  field to another has  been lost to us  with the
increasing  fragmentation and specialization of the human sciences.  From
that perspective,  we can view writing across margins  as an act of faith in
the  unity  of knowledge.  In that  sense,  we who  cross borders  are  not
26.  Letter  from  Niccolb  Machiavelli  to  Francesco  Vettori  (Dec.  10,  1513),  in
NICCOL6  MACHIAVELLI,  THE PRINCE  app.  at 107-08  (Harvey C.  Mansfield trans.,  1985).53 WASH.  & LEE L. REV. 971  (1996)
trespassers  at all.  We are more like  voyagers  drawn by the eros  of the
mind  toward  the  destination  for  which  we  were  born.  Even  if,  like
Moses,  we  cannot  enter  that promised  land,  we  can  approach  it,  and
perhaps glimpse it from afar.27
27.  Deuteronomy 34:4-5.